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     Introduction:  Planetary protection represents an 
additional set of requirements that generally have not 
been considered by developers of technologies for 
Environmental Control and Life Support Systems 
(ECLSS). Planetary protection guidelines will affect 
the kind of operations, processes, and functions that 
can take place during future human planetary explora-
tion missions.  
     Forward Contamination:  Forward contamination 
concerns will affect release of gases and discharge of 
liquids and solids, including what may be left behind 
after planetary vehicles are abandoned upon return to 
Earth. A crew of four using a state of the art ECLSS 
could generate as much as 4.3 metric tons of gaseous, 
liquid and solid wastes and trash, and 2 metric tons of 
used hardware during a 500-day surface stay.  This 
rate includes the fact that state-of-the-art ECLSS tech-
nology such as that currently on the International 
Space Station includes partial waste recycling. Certain-
ly, further closure of ECLSS systems will be of benefit 
by greater reuse of consumable products and reduced 
generation of waste products. But how must these 
wastes be managed?  It will be cost prohibitive to re-
turn these wastes to Earth.  Process technologies to 
treat, sanitize, mineralize or permanently store these 
products will add to launch mass requirements. 
     It can be presumed that planetary protection will 
affect technology development by constraining how 
technologies can operate: limiting or prohibiting cer-
tain kinds of operations or processes (e.g. venting); 
necessitating that other kinds of operations be per-
formed (e.g. sterilization; filtration of vent lines); pro-
hibiting what can be brought on a mission (e.g. ex-
tremophiles); creating needs for new capabili-
ties/technologies (e.g. containment). 
     Although any planned venting could include filtra-
tion to eliminate micro-organisms from inadvertently 
exiting the spacecraft, it may be impossible to elimi-
nate or filter habitat structural leakage. Filtration will 
add pressure drops impacting size of lines and ducts, 
affect fan size and energy requirements, and add con-
sumable mass.  Contingency operations such as cabin 
depress for fire response may have to be reconsidered, 
necessitating additional hardware such as scrubbers for 
post-fire cleanup. 
     Technologies that may be employed to remove bio-
markers and microbial contamination from liquid and 
solid wastes prior to storage or release may include 
mineralization technologies such as incineration, super 
critical wet oxidation and pyrolysis; however these 
come with significant penalties for mass, power and 
consumables.  Additionally, operations of current and 
historical human spacecraft without planetary protec-
tion needs have not led to strong demand for these 
technologies, and their development lags behind other 
functions.  More detailed knowledge is needed for 
what specific chemical and organic materials are ac-
ceptable to be vented or left behind without treatment.  
Are there concerns for non-biological contamination 
for reasons other than planetary protection, such as for 
protection of science? 
     Backward Contamination: Developers of life 
support systems have several concerns related to 
backward contamination, both physical and biological.  
The life support system may be an important step in 
minimizing the backward contamination, or have to 
react to that contamination happening. 
     The life support system is a critical part of minimiz-
ing the effects of backward contamination from dust or 
regolith on the Martian surface. Characterizing the 
properties of Martian dust before human missions is 
clearly important.  Knowing the impacts on human 
health will set the limits of allowable contamination, 
and knowing other characteristics will help design 
efficient technologies for control and removal of the 
dust.  However, it’s also very important to estimate the 
amount of dust that will be brought into the habitat 
during nominal or contingency operations.  Suitports 
and other layered defense strategies can minimize the 
dust or regolith brought deeper into the habitat, but it 
will not completely eliminate it.  While it may be ob-
vious, it’s important to point out that the vehicle life 
support system removes dust or regolith after the 
crewmember has been exposed.  It will not be a perfect 
barrier.  Medical communities should be assuming 
some level of contact between the crewmembers and 
the Martian environment is inevitable. 
     A second backward contamination issue important 
to the design of the life support system is the use of in-
situ resources.  The essential issue is whether medical 
experts will allow human consumption (through drink-
ing or atmospheric contact and metabolic use) of con-
sumables generated from the Martian surface and at-
mosphere.  Are there additional monitoring or meas-
urement requirements that need to be placed on either 
the ECLSS or ISRU system to validate quality?  There 
is a knowledge gap (at least within the ECLSS com-
munity) as to what contaminants will be present in 
ISRU generated consumables that would be different 
from either Earth supplied consumables or resources 
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from recycled wastes.  The contaminants will likely 
vary depending on process (melting ice vs. chemically 
reacting atmospheric components).  If particular types 
of consumables will never be acceptable, that places an 
important constraint on mission and system architec-
ture.  The standards currently in place for water and air 
quality are typically based on describing allowable 
quantities for expected contaminants.  The require-
ments and specifications used in ISS are likely not 
sufficient to describe the requirements for fluids and 
environments during exploration missions.  For exam-
ple, perchlorates and chromium do not appear in the 
Spacecraft Water Exposure Guidelines (SWEGs). 
     Since some backward contamination is likely inevi-
table, the need for quarantine is an important consider-
ation for life support design.  If a crewmember devel-
ops symptoms of illness after exposure, will the life 
support system have to provide an isolated atmosphere 
and water system to act as a medical quarantine?  This 
essentially results in a doubling of life support func-
tions and significant increase in vehicle size.  If the 
quarantine is short term, simpler units may be used, 
but duration becomes highly important.  And if waste 
must be disposed of after the quarantine period as if it 
were a biohazard, that also introduces difficult new 
requirements.  Quarantine may also be provided by 
separation through the operation of distinct mission 
vehicles, with an attempt to minimize cross contamina-
tion when the crew transfers from the surface ele-
ments, to an ascent vehicle, to a transit habitat, and 
back into the Orion vehicle.  The timing of these 
moves is based on orbital mechanics, and cannot be 
adjusted to wait out an illness.  Thus, medical quaran-
tine may need to be considered for all vehicle ele-
ments. 
     Closing Comments: Ultimately, there will be an 
effect on mission costs, including the mission trade 
space when planetary protection requirements begin to 
drive vehicle deisgn in a concrete way.  Planetary pro-
tection requirements need to be considered early in 
technology development and mission programs in or-
der to estimate these impacts and push back on re-
quirements or find efficient ways to perform necessary 
functions. It is expected that planetary protection will 
be a significant factor during technology selection and 
system architecture design for future missions.  
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